The civil society and
the public domain
19.1. Actors on the public doma
19.2. Historical views on state and society
19.3. The origin of authority
19.4. The generic character of any association
The organisation of an association
19.6. A strong state and a strong society
19.1. Actors on the public domain
This book is concerned with relations and characters. The difference between associations and communities,
between the civil society and the public domain reflects this distinction. The public domainwill be conceived as the set of public objective and intersubjective relation networks, often
forming communities. Here three kinds of actors operate: individual persons; different kinds of associations like enterprises, hospitals, churches or clubs, each having a specific character,
together constituting the civil society; and the state as the guardian of the public domain, with its generic character of being an association among others, and its specific character
as a republic, serving the res publica. Of old, individual persons were everywhere active in public, but free associations become more and more dominant as social players on the public
An unorganized social group of people without leadership may be called a community. Instances are a lingual community; a nation or people; a social class or caste; a culture or a civilization; a party during a reception; or the public during a concert. A community has a social coherence, forming an intersubjective network, often sustained by an objective network, like a lingual community requires a common language. A lingual community and the public opinion are not active subjects, no more than Christianity, the market, society,
a (sub-) culture, or a civilization. Communities cannot work, talk, act, show respect for each other, or negotiate. They do not bear responsibility and are not answerable. Sometimes a community is objectively determined by an artefact, like a lingual community
by a language; sometimes by a common ideology, like communism; sometimes by a connection with an association, like a nation or people is connected to a state; sometimes it is related to an event, like a party with a birthday. The suggestion that an unorganized
community may act as a subject is at most a metaphor.
This does not exclude a peculiar kind of activity within a community, influencing the
accompanying objective networks. Fashions, the markets, languages, the public opinion, etc., continuously change because of irregular subjective interactions between the actors on the public domain, much like a herd of beasts or a swarm of birds behaves communally
without leadership. The individual freedom of the actors on the public domain implies that their acts are to a large extent unpredictable, but it turns out that their collective behaviour is subject to statistical laws, allowing of, for instance, life insurances.
This does not mean that communities do not have reality or would be unimportant. The public domain consists of a variety of communities, each characterized by one of the normative relation frames: the technical infrastructure (10.6); festivities shaping communities
(11.5); the language communities (12.7) and nations as communities (12.8); fields of science (13.4); the ecumene (14.1); social relation networks (15.8); and markets (16.6)
Any organized social group with members and leadership may be called an association. Herman Dooyeweerd calls this an organized community, whereas for what I call a community he uses the term ‘interindividual and inter-communal relationship’, later abbreviated to ‘interlinkage’. It is also known
as a corporation, a company, a union, an institute like a church or a nuclear family, a congregation, or a club. As an organized whole an association has authority and discipline. Its board (whether monocratic or collective) determines the course of affairs
within the association and represents it outdoors. For that it is empowered and entitled. It acts on behalf of the association like an individual person. Any association has members, sometimes called citizens (of a state) or employees (of an enterprise or
a school). Some associations, like the United Nations Organization, have associations (in this case, the states) as members.
Because an association
maintains its identity at the leave of members from the association and the resignation of members of the board, it may be considered as a subject itself, with its own character, actively subjected to normative principles and involved with their realization
into norms. As far as it concerns its functioning on the public domain, it is called a ‘legal person’. Usually, the authority is restricted to members of the association (and to the objects possessed by the association) and within the association by
the freedom and responsibility of the members of the association.
An association can act as a subject, like a person, because it has its own
continuous identity, independent of the identity of its members. Members can leave and new members can join the association. An association can remain to exist even if its first members, its founders, have withdrawn their membership or are deceased. Like any
individual an association has a name and an address. A flag, logo, or ideogram, and a mission statement symbolise the association’s identity. It is important if its members can identify themselves with the association, socializing them. In a household
any member should feel at home. As a metaphor this also applies to other associations. Immigrants are supposed to do their utmost to struck root in their new country. This is no less true for new members of any other association.
The governor or governing board of an association has a restricted and temporal competence to act with authority within and on behalf of the association. Its authorization
rests on the recognition by its members, on discipline. ‘Political power is ultimately based on social cohesion.’ The governors cannot long continue to act within the association if they fail to earn the respect of its members, for instance by neglecting to consult them. They are accountable to their members. From the other side, the members
of an association ought to have respect for the leadership, and for each other, expressed by mutual solidarity and a sense of communality, by connectedness, otherwise the association will explode sooner or later. These are normative
principles, which not every association satisfies. Sometimes an association only exists by the grace of the exertion or threat of violence. This may occur in a state, a criminal gang, or a terror group, and also in a marriage
or a household.
The republic as the guardian of the public realm and the protector of freedom was always present in one form or another after
humanity became settled, but since the Middle Ages, the public significance of other associations increases explosively, such that the open future of the public domain seems more in the hands of free associations (churches, enterprises, NGO’s) and associations
of states (UNO, NATO) than in those of the various states apart. Their mutual relation is under duress because of widely different views on the relations between the state and other associations; the relations among states and their sovereignty; the relations
among associations and with individuals; and the freedom and responsibility of individuals and of associations. All these mutual relations promote or inhibit their dynamic development, in particular where they meet each other on the public domain. The necessity
to develop forces them to reflect on their characteristic identity, especially if this is threatened by external influences. Structurally, the general trend seems to be that associations become less intertwined with associations of a different type, contrary
to the trend that they get more publicly involved with each other. The church takes distance from the state, enterprises return to their core activities, trade unions discharge activities which are not directly related to the promotion of labourers’
interests, and families suffer the loss of many functions.
The leading motive of chapter 19 will be the freedom and responsibility of citizens
and associations acting in a civil society on the public domain, to be warranted by the state. This requires both a strong society and a strong state.
views on state and society
Views on the meaning of associations as part of a civil society differ widely. Opposite to the Protestant
view that each association has a character of its own, with sphere sovereignty independent of the character of a state, one finds the family based society; Catholic and romantic organicism; liberal individualism; socialist collectivism; and post-modern historism.
Section 19.2 briefly reviews these ideologies, finding that associations have strongly influenced the development of the Western civil society, and are starting to do so in the rest of the world, moving toward an increasingly open future of the public domain.
We shall see that the freedom of associations to act on the public domain is strongly connected to the freedom of individuals to do the same.
A tribal society based on a nomadic band or an agricultural tribe rests on subordination; on the distinction of men and women; of close and removed family members; of
masters and servants or slaves; of patrons and clients; of believers and unbelievers. This old social form based on kinship and ancestor worship characterizes an undifferentiated totalitarian society in which someone belongs exclusively to one community, to
wit, the family, band, tribe or caste, whether or not acting as an association with some kind of authority. When people meet each other, they do so as members of their family or tribe, not as individuals. These communities can be found in the past of all cultures, sometimes still in the Third World, and it is favoured not only by romantics,
but also in some Christian, Jewish, and especially Muslim orthodox circles. In several Muslim countries in the Middle East tribal relations are still dominant. Without these one cannot understand the political situation in Lybia, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan,
or Pakistan. They often coincide with religious controversies between Christians and Muslims, or between Sunnites and Shiites.
Only in the
Western world tribalism was abandoned in a process which probably started in the sixth century, when and where the Catholic church became dominant.
In a tribal society property rights are often determined by kinship. In particular land is not owned by individuals but by a family. After someone deceased their property remained within the family. During the Middle Ages the church achieved much property,
in part because of the tithe of ten percent tax on income. Often it owned up to one third of all cultivated area, being the most important source of income and wealth. The church wanted to keep this property in its own hand, allegedly because it was necessary
to sustain the poor. Therefore it forbade the priests and monks to marry and have children, and it promoted an individualized practice of heritance among the laity, such that after their death they would leave their property to the church. As a result the
tribal society disappeared from Europe much earlier than in other parts of the world.
The relations within an undifferentiated society may
be quite complicated, depending on one’s position in their family and of the family in the tribe. A tribe has many kinds of functions which in a modern society are exerted by other associations or by individuals. By the loss of these functions the family
or tribe has generally speaking no meaning left as an organized group. Only the marital bond and the nuclear family as basis of the education of children remain. The extended family only remains as an unorganized community. This is a relatively recent Western
phenomenon. In many countries family relations still play an important part, for instance in family companies. In a modern society, enterprises in which the employees consist entirely or mainly of family members are usually very small. Enterprises
being the property of a single family are more common.
In the Middle East and elsewhere in Asia and Africa, tribal politics is still
common. However, also in the West, ethnicity remained
forcefully present. In particular, populism has an ethnic background.
Polis and cosmopolis
In the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle too, the Greek polis is not differentiated. Their ideal city state (already out of date in their time) is a totalitarian community, a commonwealth,
to which everything is subordinated and in which the citizens find their happiness (eudaimonia) and their destiny (telos). In a well-ordered polis, a few rationally trained men govern as philosopher-kings. They direct well-trained spirited guardians serving as defenders and administrators, whereas the lower classes are engaged in production and commerce. At the
city boundaries the political community halts. Only free men have rights, excluding women, slaves, and foreigners. Their mutual connection is not the family, but friendship. Family ties are subordinated to the polis.
The Roman Empire extended the polis to cosmopolis, in which an increasing number of people achieved citizen rights, but it still attributed a large autonomy to the familia, including slaves and clients besides
family members. The senate consisted of important family
heads. The Roman Empire was as totalitarian as the Greek polis, but in both citizens could bring each other to justice.
The assumed, by no means always factual, biotic relationship of the tribe’s members with each other and with their ancestors constitutes a natural bonding myth for the emergence of the tribe.
The ancestors were worshiped as its founders. When tribes were united into a state, a new myth attributed the state a divine origin. The first large empires deified the power of the kings. In order to enhance their authority the rulers were worshiped as God or majesty. Like the Chinese and Byzantine emperors, Charlemagne and his anointed successors believed that they received their authority directly from God.
In the twelfth century the Catholic myth emerged that the state derives its authority from the church and through the church from God. At the end of the Middle Ages, the myth
of the divine origin was weakened by a theory about the right of insurrection. In some countries, hereditary royalty is a remainder of this, in particular if the head of state is simultaneously the head of the state church.
The first association organizing itself independent of family and state was the Christian church, at first repressed, next tolerated, then made into a state organ in the Eastern
Roman Empire, and finally in the West involved in a power struggle with the emerging nation states.
Society as an organism
Society as an organism is originally especially a Western Catholic view, later also contemplated by romantic philosophers. The rise of Christianity stroke at the roots of the totalitarian Roman state. The young church
only recognized the emperor’s authority on worldly affairs. Augustine’s book De civitate Dei assumed the existence of two communities, the city of God and the city of the world,
separated because of the fall into sin.
After in the Roman empire Christianity was elevated to state worship, medieval philosophers and theologians considered society to be an organic bi-unity,
consisting of the church equipped with the spiritual sword, and the subordinated state armed with the secular sword.
Martin Luther too adhered to a doctrine of ‘two regiments’.
Eastern-orthodox theologians identified the church with the state. If the church is subordinated to the emperor one speaks of caesaro-papism. In many countries, Muslims adopted a similar view, though in Iran the state is subordinate to the clergy. The relation
between the medieval church and state corresponded with that between the human supernatural soul and natural body. The church was concerned with the eternal salvation of people, the state with their worldly well-being.
The assumption that the state is subordinated to the church implied first that the state should not be concerned with internal affairs of the church, second that the church decided
which matters belonged to the domain of the church, and which matters belonged to the state’s jurisdiction. According to Thomas Aquinas all communities, except the church, are organic parts of the state, like parts of a body. This totalitarian view was
mitigated by the principle of subsidiarity, stating that each social activity is subsidiary. It ought to support the members of the social body. The principle of subsidiarity
assumes that society exists of a hierarchy of higher and lower communities or organs, of which the state is the highest and all embracing, with the most important norm that a higher organ should not be concerned with what a lower one can do. In 1931 pope Pius
XI confirmed the principle of subsidiarity in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, and in particular the Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain elaborated it.
Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity is applicable whenever an association as a whole has more or less autonomous parts. Such a relation of a whole and
its parts is found in a state divided into provinces and municipalities; a national or international church with regional dioceses and local parishes; a national party with local branches; a holding company with more or less independent subsidiary companies;
or a chain of shops. The principle of subsidiarity may be considered an important strategy for the internal organization of an association, in which the separate parts receive as much freedom and responsibility as possible. It determines the relation of both
the United States and the European Union (as well as Canada and Switzerland) to its member states. It opposes a centralized government. However, the organicist view on which it is based provides no insight into the relation of mutually independent associations,
because it does not recognize these. At most it tolerates them.
Because the Roman-Catholic Church circa 1965 abandoned the idea of an all-embracing
society, some politicologists now consider the vertical principle of subsidiarity and the principle of sphere sovereignty (also called horizontal subsidiarity, see below) as being slight differences within a converging view that they call communitarism or
Christian pluralism. It is the political philosophy
of Christian-democratic and conservative parties in Europe. The principle of recognition of the independence of all kinds of associations is, however, not equivalent to an internal organization principle within such associations.
Ultimately, in the Western society, the church once more became separated from the state. This led to freedom of faith, the recognition that any person is free in one’s
conscience, being fully responsible for their relation to God. People who are free in their conscience also demand freedom in other respects. The rise of free associations apart from family ties and the state does not accidentally coincide with the recognition
of freedom of faith. It formed the basis of a republican and democratic society, not founded on tribal or nationalistic views, but on free associations.
Medieval European feudalism is a specific form of organicism. It was based on the division of the population into three estates. Nobility and clergy were strongly hierarchical, with the king at the head of nobility and the pope heading the church. Lacking
such a hierarchy, the third estate distinguished free people (especially living in the cities), slaves, and serfs which were bound to the land on which they lived and worked, serving their noble or clerical lord. In North-West Europe serfdom disappeared
in the fourteenth century, perhaps due to the mid-century plague. In Eastern Europe it lasted into the nineteenth century.
only existed in the cities. The local guilds were labour associations.
Liberal individualism recognizes only individuals to be original members of society. They ought to have as much freedom of acting as possible. Each association is considered to be a voluntary set of individuals, no more than the sum of the members of the set. Individuals may form a union with a determined goal, based
on a contract, which they can break or revise at any time. Liberals reject the specific character of associations. Enlightened natural law scholars like Jean Bodin, Johannes Althusius, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel
Kant, attempted to found the state in the myth of a social contract. (In contrast, John Rawls uses the theory of the social contract to found justice (as did Kant too), not the state.) The state is now legitimized by a voluntary agreement of citizens, a contract in which the citizens transfer their natural rights in part to the collective state. Thomas Hobbes characterized the state of nature as an unlimited anarchy,
but John Locke assumed that people have naturally inalienable human rights, to be respected by any sovereign. The reason for the formation of a state is to warrant these rights. For Jean-Jacques Rousseau not the state, but the community (the people) is the bearer of authority. In the romantic period this became the nation.
Contrary to Bodin, Althusius emphasized that authority should never be an absolute sovereign. At each level in the state, the ruler should be checked by a representation of
the people, a view later developed by Charles Montesquieu. Rousseau propagated the absolute and undivided sovereignty of the people. Hobbes preferred the reign of a single person having the consent of his subjects, because he considered a strong government
necessary to suppress haughty people. For Locke it
became a small step to the sovereignty of the parliament. It became a leading motive in British political thought. Because it clashes with the idea of sharing sovereignty in the European Union, it led to the ‘brexit’ in 2019. The idea of a social
contract with checks and balances (5.4) forms the foundation of the constitution of the United States of America.
The theory of the social contract rests on the Enlightenment principle that any individual is autonomous, having primacy above any association. Its critics
observed that people never lived outside a community and contested the view that the state can be seen as a set of autonomous individuals.
Anybody is a member of the state without being asked, based on birth, not on a contract. Philosophers defending the idea of the social contract readily admit this to be a theoretical fiction, having no historical ground.
It appears to be more likely that the modern state emerged from a multitribal community.
An intermediate form would be a class or caste state, in which people are classified according to their birth status. Both the recognition of individual rights apart from tribe or state and the recognition of the independence of associations that are not bound
to a family or the state, are more recent than the emergence of states apart from tribal ties. The liberation from tribal ties constitutes an important part of the historical development of modern society.
Enlightenment philosophers based the sovereignty of the people on the contract theory. They often overemphasized democracy, without recognizing that this is not characteristic of the state, with
its specific character of being the guardian of the public domain. Rather, democracy is a form of management that can be realized in many associations besides the state. Participation of the members in the leadership confirms the view that the generic character
of any association is founded in relations of keeping company.
During the nineteenth century, socialist collectivism arose as a romantic reaction to individualistic liberalism. It too does not allow of much room for independent associations, because it considers society to be the all-encompassing social reality.
Collectivism overemphasizes the public domain, which it often identifies with the state. Calling man a social animal, Karl Marx assumed that whatever a man does has the society as its perspective and should serve the community. According to nineteenth-century
romantic nationalism and twentieth-century fascism, this community was the people, determined by its language and culture. According to national-socialism this was the Volksgemeinschaft,
determined by a common race. According to communism it is the proletariat, represented by the everything embracing communist party. In some Islamic states it is the common faith, laid down in the Koran and in tradition.
For social-democrats, who were usually strongly related to trade unions, the collective is the labour community embracing all institutions and associations, not only the state, factories and companies,
trade unions and political parties, but also families and schools, preparing children for their position in the society conceived as a labour community, as well as clubs, if these fulfil a useful function in society. None of these views has an eye for
the existence of free associations, even if the social-democrats recognize the rights of association and of assembly.
Whereas liberals stress
the autonomy and freedom of any individual, socialists have the tendency to emphasize that human beings are determined by their social environment, as well as by their physical, biological and psychic constitution.
The historistic myth legitimizes the state exclusively on the basis of historical developments, for instance its
factual origin from a family or tribe, or a coalition of tribes. The transition from family groups (for instance of hunters/gatherers) via tribes to states is strongly connected to the increasing population density and the growth of settlements to cities.
The people are subordinate to the prince, like the Roman family is subordinated to the pater familias. The monarch is the owner and his successor the heir of the sovereignty.
Therefore there is no clear separation between the fortune and income of the monarch and that of the state. The traditionalist or conservative current within historism (Edmund Burke, circa 1800 and Friedrich Hayek, second half of the twentieth century) rejects
both the theocratic view about the divine origin of authority and the rationalist contract theory. In a long process complex systems like states are made by and for people, ‘results of human action but not of human design’.
Earlier, Johann Gottfried von Herder, the founder of historism, emphasized that each human community is unique and separate from its neighbours. This historistic view, denying structural normative principles for associations, has given rise to nationalism (15.8).
From the Reformation to the American
and French revolutions, citizens have liberated themselves from monarchy, nobility, and ecclesiastical hierarchy, taking over the leadership of the network society. In the nineteenth century, when the cities displayed ever more differentiation without much
integration, the idea of a cultural unity transferred from the settlement to the nation. Nationalists believed that the cultural differences within a country could be bridged by an often mystic unity. In the nineteenth century Protestants were more inclined to nationalism than Catholics or Jews, and liberals more than socialists. Often one emphasized the uniqueness of the nation by dissociating from other nations, getting these
in wrong. In Protestant countries one identified the nation with Protestantism, and Catholics and Jews were kept outside the nation, by calling them ‘transmontanists’ and ‘internationalists’ respectively. Nineteenth-century Austrian-Hungarian
and German anti-semitism was initially more nationalist than racist, but it became a fertile breeding-ground for the genocides of the twentieth century. After the rivalries between settlements grew into conflicts between peoples, the search for the own identity
degenerated into the glorification of the nation and atrocious wars. Outside the national borders one only recognized enemies and allies against enemies. Nationalism is a perverse form of historism, because it disdains the history of other peoples, predominating that of its own. Georg Hegel and his adherents have provided this view with a philosophical justification: ‘The self-consciousness
of a particular Nation … is the objective actuality in which the Spirit of the Time invests its Will. Against this absolute Will the other particular national minds have no rights: that Nation dominates the World ...’
The national state, characterized by absolute power, cannot but strive after expansion. This view, influential not only in Germany but also elsewhere in Europe, has led to the long European war
Nationalism has proved to be a bad form of integration. It is an attempt to counter the integration of others. It does not contribute to the historical development of a
free society, but is reactionary throughout. Nationalism is a modern form of tribalism, in which one’s own tribe is the measure of society. It does not lead to social integration, but to discrimination and expulsion.
As a competitor of nineteenth century nationalism, the industrial revolution induced the class struggle. Class formation as a social stratification of the poor, middle groups,
and the rich appears to be a consequence of economic differentiation. However, class distinctions come more to the fore in differences of descent, education, training, use of language, intelligence, faith, habits, wealth, and income. It is expressed by the
popular opposition of ‘the people’ and ‘the élite’.
The twenty-first century saw an upsurge of nationalism,
most successfully with rulers like Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Viktor Orbán, Hugo Chávez, and Donald Trump, but also with Britain’s brexit and several minority populist political parties elsewhere.
Opposed to the social contract theory, a Protestant (in particular Calvinian)
tradition maintains the principle that associations are characterized by normative principles laid down in the creation, and developed in the course of history. In the social differentiation and integration process, neither individuals, nor free associations,
nor the state or the church play a primary part. For the formation of associations people are responsible, and human freedom makes use of the possibilities presented by each character type.
sovereignty (soevereiniteit in eigen kring) is originally a typical Dutch term for an unsuspected widespread phenomenon. In particular during the twentieth century, the existence of free associations, having their own administration
independent of the republic which only exerts supervision of the public domain, has become the hallmark of the free Western society, even if it is not always recognized as such. Elsewhere it expands explosively too. The fact that Abraham Kuyper designed his
view of sphere sovereignty in the nineteenth century testifies to his prophetic mind. In fact, this is historically a much more interesting phenomenon than the victory of neo-liberalism proclaiming the end of history, according to Francis Fukuyama.
If in one respect Protestantism collides with Catholic, liberal, collectivist, and totalitarian views, it concerns their insight into associations. Since the sixteenth century, Protestants argue
and practice that associations belong to a character type of their own; that these are irreducible to individual interests or to the interest of a collective; that associations are not subordinate but co-ordinate; that each person belongs to several associations;
that no all-embracing association exists; that nobody is embraced completely by any association whatsoever; and that various mutually irreducible character types of associations exist. There is no better warrant for freedom than this Protestant view of a civil
society. The ongoing discussion of the idea of a ‘civil society’ seems to overlook this Protestant interpretation.
The principle of sphere sovereignty is a societal principle, characterized by the way people deal with associations and keep
each other’s company. It is a political principle too, because it indicates that an association does not derive its authority from other associations, but from the creational order,
from God’s sovereignty, such that authority should never be absolute. It is not an organizational principle. Unlike the above mentioned principle of subsidiarity, it is not applicable
to the mutual relations of the state with its provinces and local communities, as far as these are subordinate parts of the state.
Sovereignty presupposes some kind of authoritative
rule. Therefore, the principle of sphere sovereignty only applies to associations, not to unorganized social communities. The view that sphere sovereignty applies to the authority in associations can be found both in Abraham Kuyper and in Herman Dooyeweerd.
Moreover Kuyper also speaks of sphere sovereignty in ‘spheres of life’, like art or science, which Dooyeweerd develops into the ontological principle of creaturely diversity
or mutual irreducibility of modal aspects and character types. In order to avoid this ambiguity I prefer to limit the concept of ‘sovereignty’ to bearers of authority and authority having instances, and ‘sphere sovereignty’ to the governor or board of an association.
Sphere sovereignty does not imply that associations are autonomous, independent of other associations. In fact, associations form many kinds of networks, in which they cooperate to achieve their
goals. The meaning of sphere sovereignty is that any kind of authority is limited. It promotes the freedom and responsibility of individual persons. Because they belong to various associations, they can be alternatively leaders in one and subordinate members
in another association.
The principle of sphere sovereignty does not in the least mean that each association should have an ideological foundation. The typically Dutch phenomenon of
the ‘verzuiling’ (the compartmentalization of society from about 1850 to 1980) could make that plausible, but Kuyper’s principle applies to associations having no relation to any world view as well.
Although it has its roots in nineteenth-century nationalism, the term ‘populism’ became popular only in the twenty-first century. Populist movements
emerged in Europe and the America’s since the 1980’s. There is no generally accepted definition, perhaps because populism took various forms in different countries. However, there is some agreement about several common features.
Populism assumes the existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: 'the people' and 'the elite', with an antagonistic relationship: a positive valorisation of 'the people' and a denigration of
'the elite'. Since the 1970’s, the differences in income and wealth between the highest ‘haves’ (estimated between 1% and 10% of the population) and the lowest ‘have-nots’ increased tremendously everywhere on the world,
accompanied by a decreasing mobility between ethnic and age groups, and the rise of powerful oligarchies. Populists favour the social media above the ‘elitist’ traditional communication channels.
Populism stresses the idea of popular sovereignty,
preferring direct democracy above representational democracy. Each populist movement pretends to represent the people more than the formal democracy of elected representatives which they mistrust. Instead populists usually rely on a charismatic leader. Populists
tend to exaggerate democracy, especially direct democracy executed by referendums. However, accountability is a norm for any association, not only for the state. Often populists do not hold their charismatic leaders accountable.
Populists have an ethnic view of the people. Because they want to keep their own ethnic group pure, they abhor immigrants. In this way, populism is kindred to tribalism.
Because of their assumption that the people is sovereign, populists reject the idea of the constitutional state. It does not accept that the state is subject to justice. It rejects the rule of law, because the people transcends the
law. Populist rulers like Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Viktor Orbán, and Donald Trump try to subject the courts of justice to the executive.
A constitutional state
subjects itself to international justice, rather than fight armed conflicts. In the past and present, states close treaties and a constitutional state recognizes a treaty to be binding
for national law. The twentieth century witnesses the emergence of a globalization of justice, initially voluntarily, later compulsory. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the International Court of Justice was established in The Hague, gradually receiving
more prestige and competences, and meanwhile being complemented with the International Court of Criminal Law. The idea of international justice appears to be at variance with the populist view of the inlimited sovereignty of the people. Populists are typical
Populism is sometimes called a ‘thin ideology’. It has to be fleshed out by a right or left ‘thick ideology’, like liberalism or socialism, giving
rise to right and left-wing populism.
19.3. The origin of authority
The principle of
sphere sovereignty implies that society is not an undivided comprehensive whole with a single authority. Also in this respect it differs from all other views discussed above. It depends on the Christian view of the divine lawful origin of authority, allowing
of and even implying a division of human authority. Freedom and responsibility of individuals and of associations in the civil society would be severely threatened if the state or any other institute would have unlimited power. In fact such a state is not
strong but unstable. A really strong state has a strong civil society as its counterpart.
The question of the meaning of the state and other associations is therefore related to the question of the origin of authority. Isaiah Berlin considers ‘the problem of obedience’ to be the heart of political philosophy. In concrete cases the foundation, expansion, contraction, or disappearance of a state rests on conquest, revolution, rebellion, or liberation from foreign domination. This indicates how a state is historically arisen or disengaged from one or more other states, how a state came to power, but it does not answer the question of the origin of the republic’s or any other association’s authority.
The answer to this question strongly depends on one’s world view and is often expressed in a myth, a faith story legitimizing the authority.
Christians believe that the state is an institution of God and the authority of the government is given by God.
This can hardly be valid for any concrete state in its historical form, but it can be true for the general character type of the state and, in fact, for all types of associations. In his often cited letter to the Romans, Paul does not call
the state but any government: ‘Every person must submit to the supreme authorities. There is no authority but by act of God, and the existing authorities are instituted by him.’
In this view the profile of an association originates from God’s laws, not from its historic realization. Nevertheless any board exerts authority by the grace of God, the supreme sovereign,
who does not provide a license to act arbitrarily but lawfully, according to divine normative principles. Each government ought to satisfy the universal political norm that it should not abuse its authority. If a government satisfies this norm, the members
of the association ought to obey the authority within the association’s limits.
There is an important difference between the specific
character type of the state and that of other associations. Whereas each association exerts authority within its own sphere, the state as a republic also exerts authority on the public domain.
In the state as well as in other associations, authority is often conceived in a conservative way: to maintain the existing order at all costs. A more progressive view insists that any authority should display leadership with respect to the dynamic
development of the association and its membership, and as far as the state is concerned, the development of the public domain.
philosophy is nowadays sharply distinguished from philosophy of law (and politics from the theory of law), it is still controversial to state that politics differs from justice. Until recently, the European part of humanity lived in an era that derived its
juridical concepts entirely from the state, conceiving of the state as a model of political unity. The best way to make this clear is to point to a number of unwanted consequences of their identification.
Traditionally, the rule
of law means that justice is bound to laws, not merely to the conscience and insight of judges and others. However, Francis Fukuyama (admitting that ‘... there are as many defintions of “rule of law” as there are legal scholars...’) defines the rule of law such that ‘... the individual holding political power feels bound by the law ... The rule of law is a separate component of political order that puts limitations on a state’s power.’ This may be considered a definition of a ‘constitutional state’ (Rechtsstaat).
The moderating principle of equity attempts to prevent unintended consequences of the application of a rule. According to Aristotle, the principle of equity allowed judges to moderate the rigidity of the law, without transcending the limits of the law.
The rule of lawalso means that the juridical process should proceed independent of political rulers. Justice should transcend the specific interests of the parties involved in civil or criminal lawsuits. It should pass judgment neutrally and impartially. Evidently, this is a norm, not to be confused with the fact that judges may be influenced by their class, their education, or by the public opinion, and are sometimes corrupt.
In order to warrant legal security and equality of rights, since the end of the eighteenth century Western states have codified existing law, by systematically collecting and revising laws into
comprehensive codes. The Code Civil (Code Napoleon, 1804) has had a large influence on civil justice, like the Code Pénal (1810) on criminal law.
rule of law has a political meaning as well. The Christian view that human authority is derived from God’s authority implies that it is subject to God’s law, to the normative principles laid down in the creation and known to all. These are the
principles of mutual love, justice, good government, mutual service, respect, trust, reason, clarity, joy and skilful labour. Since the Enlightenment declared humans to be autonomous, they had to take recourse to a legalistic view of law.
From the eighteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, legal positivism identified justice with the written laws of the country (17.3).
According to Mark Tebbit, the nineteenth-century utilist Jeremy Bentham was the first legal positivist, followed by John Austin and in the twentieth century by Herbert Hart in England and Hans Kelsen in Austria.
However, already in the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin developed a ‘naive legalistic variety of juridical positivism’.
Influenced by pragmatism, American judges are more
realistic and less legalistic than their European colleagues. For instance, for American commercial life rights and duties are usually not laid down in laws (as in Europe), but in jurisprudence. According to positivist legalism a rule or law was legal if justified
by a higher law. The highest law was the constitution, derived from an earlier constitution and ultimately from a mythical social contract, succeeding the state of nature or ‘original position’.
Romantic optimists like Jean-Jacques Rousseau considered this an ideal situation in which no injustice occurred. Pessimists like Thomas Hobbes believed it was a state of homo homini lupus, man is a wolf to man, a state in which justice does not exist.
In legalism the lawful order was narrowed down to legislation. Legal positivists rejected Thomas Aquinas’ rationalist natural philosophy, considering justice to be of divine origin, knowable
from human nature, in conformity with Aristotle’s philosophy. Plato derived justice from the unchangeable world of ideas, and Hugo Grotius from human reason.
the laws of the state. It held the doctrine stating that nearly all rules of justice are legal rules, that in principle the law is complete and that a judge has to apply the law without questioning it. Legalism is inspired by utilitarian enlightenment philosophers believing that simple and elementary rules, derived from reason and natural law, had to take the place of intricate traditional law ruling European society of their time.
This implied the separation of political formulation and juridical application of justice. Concerning the first, courts of justice are subjected to law-making organs of the state. Concerning the second, the courts are independent of the government, whereas
the executive organs of the state are subjected to justice administered by the courts of justice. This separation and balance of powers (Charles Montesquieu’s trias politica, 1748)
presupposed that the three powers (executive, legislative, and judicial) are all organs of the state. (In fact, Montesquieu did not discuss a separation, but a dispersal of powers, like he found in England. He also believed that the judiciary should not be
an organ of the state.) The separation of the three powers intended to warrant the freedom of the citizens. Emerged from humanist philosophy, it did not even consider the possibility that justice and authority with discipline might be mutually irreducible.
In the second half of the twentieth century legal positivism came under fire, however, first because courts of justice took the freedom to interpret laws. Jurisprudence became as much a source of justice as the laws of the country, in the USA even more than in Europe. Legalism presupposes that only the legislature is allowed to interpret its own laws. It is the task of a judge
to provide an interpretation of the law applied to the case in question. According to legalism, judges may only administer justice according to the written law. In practice, they also take into account principles of justice, jurisprudence, influential commentaries,
the circumstances, and interests of all parties, changing views, and practices. They have a large margin, for instance if the penal law only indicates maximum penalties. Judges may interpret a law slightly different from the intentions of the legislative.
In extreme cases they may even decide against a law. This means that administering justice is not an abstract activity, but a very concrete one. Though it is juridically typified, in principle judges take into account all aspects of human being.
Legalism has two faces. From a liberal point of view, stressing the individual freedom of citizens with respect to the state, everything that is not prohibited
by law is just and therefore admitted. In the name of this view a lot of injustice has been committed, which new laws had to prevent. For instance, in the nineteenth century slavery and child labour were not lawfully prohibited and therefore admitted, until
slavery was forbidden, and child labour restricted by law. According to the liberal world view, only then child labour was unjust. People defending this variant sometimes say that what is not prohibited by law is just but not necessarily moral. It is a moral
question whether one makes use of the fact that the government allows or tolerates certain matters. It is a moral question whether one accepts slavery or child labour as long as there is no law interdicting it. ‘For natural lawyers, the legal principles
revealed by a purely descriptive account of law are inherently moral; for positivists, the law in its actuality is the practical expression of a political decision, the moral content of which is quite irrelevant.’
This is a consequence of the view that the law determines what is right or wrong. It opposes the view that justice is a universal principle, to be actualized into norms, including state laws. This means that one makes laws because slavery and child
labour are unjust, not to make them unjust. The distinction between just and unjust action is always part of ethics.
It is immoral to act unjustly, whether this act is prohibited by law or not. Legalistic attempts to slip through the meshes of the law, not only popular with tax payers, are immoral if it leads to behaviour contrary to the principles of justice. Formalistic
legalism sometimes means that a judge acquits a criminal because of mistakes made by the police or the attorney. Of course, police and the attorney have to respect the rights of the accused, and the judge ought to penalize trespassers. However, it runs counter the common sense of justice when a criminal is acquitted because of a formal mistake.
In another variant of legalism everything is prohibited what is not allowed by the state. In practice this leads to an abundance of rules and to suppression of inevitable resistance. The best illustration
is the Soviet-Union, which ultimately collapsed under its top-heavy bureaucracy in 1990. However, this variant not only occurs in a dictatorship, but also in a moderate form in countries influenced by social-democracy where many kinds of activities are subject
to a licence by the government.
Both views identify justice with written law. They consider the state as the only source of justice. Legalism
is a consequence of statism, the overrating of the state, considered as representative of the volonté générale (the general will, the public interest) exclusively determining what is right. An extreme form is known as Befehl
ist Befehl: people having done injustice defend themselves by saying that they only obeyed a command from a higher level, ultimately from the state. This view, identifying justice with the political principle of authority and discipline, has become notorious
since the Nazi-regime and has been abolished by Western justice.
However, it was not restricted to Germany, for it is a consequence of legalism, reducing justice to laws given by the state. It deprives both individuals and associations the freedom and responsibility to act in all circumstances not only legally, but also
just. Even if he finds justice in the laws of the country, a judge ought not to pass a sentence in the name of the law, or of the queen, or of the state, but in the name of justice as a universal value, irreducible to state or politics.
Legalism can be warded off by recognizing that the juridical relation frame is irreducible to the political frame, and that the state as a politically characterized association
does not surpass justice but is subject to it, like any other association and each individual. The distinction of the political from the juridical frame has important consequences for the analysis of the characters of associations, in particular of the state.
In the words of Abraham Kuyper (1880), any association is sovereign in its own sphere. In a civilized and free society, this sovereignty is never absolute.
It is restricted both by the individual freedom of its members and the internal sovereignty of other associations. The authority of its management should not be extended beyond its competence, and only its members are required to observe discipline. The fact
that this Protestant view is effectively dominant in present-day Western society is remarkable, for it contradicts both the humanist ideal of autonomous individual subjects and the Roman-Catholic view on church and state, even with the mitigating principle
of subsidiarity (19.2). Sovereignty presupposes some kind of authoritative rule. Therefore, the principle of sphere sovereignty only applies to associations, not to unorganized social communities, as Kuyper erroneously assumed.
Abraham Kuyper’s political view of sphere sovereignty differs from Herman Dooyeweerd’s, who interprets it as the ontological principle of creational diversity.
For example, Dooyeweerd applies the term sphere sovereignty to the mutual irreducibility of the modal aspects, ignoring the fact that no modal aspect is ruled by a sovereign.
‘Whereas for Kuyper sphere sovereignty had been primarily a sociological principle which provided a guideline in practical politics, Dooyeweerd expanded it into a general principle of ontological irreducibility, applicable also to such categories as
life and matter, faith and emotion.’ He puts
sphere sovereignty at the law side of reality, applying it both to modal aspects and to types. However, any sovereign is a subject, even if they positivize norms into laws or rules, and the political principle of sphere sovereignty applies to associations
being subjects as well. For instance, according to Dooyeweerd the university (as a type) would have sphere sovereignty with respect to the state (as a different type), whereas I maintain that the principle of sphere sovereignty implies that
any university (as an individual association) should have sphere sovereignty with respect to any state. Contrary to Dooyeweerd’s, my view has the consequence that two universities have sphere sovereignty with respect to each other.
However, I fully agree that the university as a character type is irreducible to the type of the state.
The relation between
authority and discipline is not a subject-object relation but a normative subject-subject relation. Authoritative rule becomes authoritarian or autocratic if the authorities treat their subjects like objects, if discipline becomes subordination, in the extreme
if discipline reduces to slavery. Being a member implies to play a more or less active part in the association. In any association, the membership should participate in the decisions of the authority, which ought to consult its members about its decisions.
Participation in whatever form is not a peculiar Western cultural phenomenon. Rather, it is a universal political normative principle to which any association should confirm according to its specific character.
State democracy differs from the voice of the people in the church or labour co-partnership. Like any normative principle, it can be positivized into norms and rules in many different ways.
It should be observed that this encyclopaedia describes various types of social communities and their characters. According to the philosophy of dynamic development, these types belong to the law side of creation.
Types are given and can be discovered as laws for the creation. A type is determined by a set of invariable natural laws and normative principles like those of justice or love of one’s neighbour. On the other hand, with the exception of natural
characters, a character is a set of natural laws and normative principles as well as variable positivized norms. Hence, the character of a particular social community is in part the product of human activity. In my view, the historical development
of natural characters starts from the technical relation frame of human labour, which therefore has a pivotal function in history. For this reason, Dooyeweerd calls the technical relation frame the ‘historical’ or ‘cultural’
modal aspect of ‘control, command, mastery or power’. By assuming that all associations (except for the natural ones like marriage and family) are founded in this modal aspect, Dooyeweerd reduces authority to power, control or command over people,
in the state to be conducted by justice, in the church by faith, in a business by economical principles. In both respects, I offer a different opinion.
First, the fact that associations are actualized and differentiated in the course of history should have no consequences at all for the characterization of various character types of social groups. It is not an argument against the assumption
that the generic character of any association is founded in the relation frame of social intercourse, and we are free to investigate the foundation frame of its specific character without presupposing that it is invariably the technical one.
Second, in my view authority cannot be reduced to power, control or command over people. If some authority has to resort to the exertion of power, it
is a testimonium paupertatis, a testimonial of incompetence, only excusable if the relation of authority and discipline is severely disturbed. The political principle of sphere sovereignty is not expressed in the secondary foundation, but in the primary
qualification of the generic character of associations.
19.4. The generic character of any
Because human beings always act in relation to each other, political philosophy cannot neglect
social philosophy. In particular the distinction between organized and unorganized social connections turns out to be relevant for understanding the dynamic development of humanity. Besides, the growing number of professional specialists is a condition for
the diversification of social groups. Quite often, associations are formed by professionals sharing a common goal.
Whereas the public domain
consists of objective and intersubjective networks, civil society may be considered the set of free associations and their relations. We shall investigate their character types. The present section discusses the generic character of any association.
The specific character of several association types have been described in the preceding chapters 10-18.
An organized social group
with leadership, to be called an association, has a governing person or board with authority over the group. It is also known as a corporation, a company, or an institute. In Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887) by the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft corresponds especially with an
unorganized community characterized by social cohesion, like a family or a circle of friends, whereas with Gesellschaft one should rather think of a businesslike organized association
like a company. Tönnies assumes that in society an evolution takes place from a Gemeinschaft to a Gesellschaft.
Such an association is
the state, the guardian of the public domain. If a state does not tolerate other associations besides itself, one speaks of state absolutism. The recognition of free associations independent of the state is called pluralism.
Free associations have flowered especially since the twentieth century, but some kinds are much older. Because they also act on the public domain, this becomes ever more important.
Like individual persons, but contrary to unorganized communities, associations act as subjects in all relation frames. An association has its own continuous identity, independent of the identity of its members.
It maintains its identity at the leave of members from the association and the resignation of members of the board. It has its own character, it is actively subjected to normative principles and it is involved with their realization into norms. Usually, the authority is restricted to members of the association
(and to the objects possessed by the association) and within the association by the freedom and responsibility of the members of the association, especially if these are professionals.
Like any individual an association has a name and address. A flag, logo, or ideogram, and a mission statement symbolise the association’s identity. It is important if its members can identify themselves with the
association, which socializes`` them. In a household any member should feel at home. As a metaphor this is also stated about other associations. Immigrants are supposed to do their utmost to struck root in their new country. This is no less true for new members
of any other association.
It may be questioned whether associations are subjects in the prelogical relation frames as well as in the normative
frames (Jonathan Chaplin doubts this.) However, there
are large and small associations (which can be counted), referring to the quantitative aspect; they often act on a restricted region, where they need to have an address (spatial), and from which they move occasionally (kinetic); they interact in various ways
(physical); they grow (biotic) and behave well or badly (psychic). It is true that associations having no bodies cannot be measured or weighed, because as subjects associations are characteristically different from material bodies, acting in their
own characteristic way. Therefore I shall assume that associations, like individual persons, act as subjects in all relation frames.
19.4 investigates the supposition that character types of associations, conceived as sets of normative principles,
are recognizable constant factors in human culture and civilization. In contrast, the norms determining the actual characters of concrete associations are formed in history, and therefore culturally different.
Each association appears to have a dual
character. The specific character distinguishes diverse types of associations from each other, each specific type being primarily characterized by one of the relation frames. Often a specific association counts professionals among its members, specialized
in the activity deployed by the association. The generic character is the same for all associations. (In contrast, the generic character of human-made artefacts is primarily characterized either by the technical relation frame, or by one
of the other normative frames, when it is secondarily characterized by the technical frame, 10.1.) Before investigating the specific character type of a number of associations, first the generic profile shared by all associations will be discussed. Establishing an association as an organized whole,
it accounts for the many organizational similarities of otherwise widely different corporations.
The governor or governing board has a restricted
and temporal competence to act with authority within and on behalf of the association. Their authorization rests on the recognition by the members, on discipline. The members of the board cannot long continue to act within the association if they fail to earn the respect of its members, for instance by neglecting to consult them. Moreover the members of an association ought to have respect
for each other, expressed by mutual solidarity and a sense of communality, by connectedness. Otherwise the association would explode sooner or later. These are normative principles, which
not every association satisfies. Sometimes an association only exists by the grace of the exertion or threat of violence. This may occur in a state, a criminal gang, or a terror group, and also in a marriage or a household.
Therefore the generic character of an association is primarily qualified by the political relation frame (because it has leadership) and secondarily founded by the frame of companionship (because it has members). For
most associations the specific character is qualified by a different relation frame than the political one, for instance the character of the church by the frame of faith and the character of an enterprise by the economic frame. Only the character of the republic
as the guardian of the public domain appears to be qualified both specifically and generically by the political relation frame.
authority within an association is restricted by its generic and specific character, by the values and norms valid for the group. In the first place the authority is restricted to the association itself: no association ought to rule over another one. (This restriction is only tenable if the two associations belong to different specific kinds.) In a modern, plural society, the state does not rule over the church or the church over the state. Enterprises should be able to display themselves
freely. Freedom of associating and assembling should be acknowledged. Second, in each association the authority ought to be restricted by agreements and rules, by division of authority and members’ participation. Third, the bearers of authority ought
to account for their acts. Fourth, it should be clear how bearers of authority are nominated, how long their term of office is, and how they transfer their office to someone else. In the course of history, these general rules have been developed in various
ways, conform the association’s specific character. It is obvious that in an association the office is to be distinguished from the officers.
It is quite common to interpret the authority in an association in a juridical sense. Yet it seems better to consider the authority
as a political form, not characterized by justice but by policy, by competent decision making, directed to the realization of accepted goals, and on the prevention and solution of conflicts, the maintenance of peace within the association, with other associations,
and with individuals the association connects with. In a football match the referee has a juridical function, whereas the leadership is allotted to the captain and/or the coach. The leadership in an association as policy determining, decision making, executing,
and maintaining organ is generically characterized by the political frame, next by the relation frames characterizing the association’s specific character. The maintaining task of the authority means that it takes care that the members accept and execute
the decisions taken. A leadership neglecting this task soon loses its authority.
Discipline means accepting of guidance and respecting those
who are in command. It aims at the integration of the members into an adequately functioning social group. In some associations discipline is more obvious than in others, compare for instance a jail or a barracks with a hospital, a school, or an enterprise.
However, leadership and discipline are both conditions for the existence of any association. Where leadership or discipline are lacking, the organized group gets lost. Therefore I propose to characterize the generic character
of each association primarily by the political relation frame and secondarily by the frame of companionship, primarily by policy and secondarily by social integration.
Democracy, accountability, or participation, roughly conceived as the leadership’s obligation to consult the association’s members and to
account for its deeds, is not merely a norm for the state, but for every other association as well. It can have many forms, like direct democracy (in which all members of the association partake, for instance in a small enterprise, or in a referendum). More
common is representative democracy based on elections or representation. In the first case the elected is usually not directly accountable to the voters, in the second case this is a possibility. In order to prevent dictatorship, against de view accepting
only democracy according to the principle of one man, one vote, one finds the pluralistic view looking for democracy in a multitude of decisive organs within the state, especially as grown
in Protestant countries. In the Dutch Republic, the Provincial States consisted of representatives of the cities and the States-General assembled representatives of the Provincial States. In the German Bundesrat and in the European Council of Ministers, the
member states are represented. Populists reject this kind of democracy.
The members of an association experience mutual solidarity, a sense
of community. This is expressed in mutual forms of
social conduct, more specified by the characterizing relation frame of the association’s specific character. Solidarity in a labour group differs from the love between siblings in a nuclear family. In a church solidarity comes to the fore in a different
way than in a football club. In a state solidarity is expressed in civic responsibility and patriotism. Many associations endeavour to promote solidarity, by means of facilities like a canteen, by organising events like communal festive or memorial days, or
by publishing a magazine.
As a tertiary characteristic, an association may be interlaced with other associations. Many large associations are
interlaced with an economically characterized organization,having a bureaucratic character of its own (19.5). Because an association is a subject in all relation frames, it may assume a specific purpose to act in a relation frame that does not primarily
or secondarily characterize it. Several examples will be given below.
The characters of both artefacts and associations are subject to historical development, in two ways. First, characters are sets of laws, to be realized at the subject side in the course of time.
Normative characters share this property with natural characters. Second, at the law side these characters consist of natural laws and normative principles, but also of norms, which may
differ widely in various cultures and at different times. In order to delimit the latter diversity, philosophy is often forced to restrict its investigation to character types, which do
not contain variable norms, but only presumed invariable values, besides natural laws.
The assumption of invariable character types does neither
imply that states, churches, enterprises and hospitals, or art products and languages have always existed, nor that they would not widely differ from each other, and change forever. In fact, the hypothesis of invariable character types allows us to compare
these characters as they developed in the course of history.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate invariant character types for associations.
Only these types are apt to be described in a general philosophical framework. The characters themselves develop in history dependent on culture and civilization. In this sense these are products of human activity. This means that within each given characterization
an enormous variation of characters of associations is to be expected. Only if associations satisfy a common invariant profile, a character type, it will be possible to recognize them, to compare them and to write their history.
In the preceding chapters we have already discussed a large variety of associations. First of all, people cooperate in their labour (10.5). Next they play together in aesthetically
qualified associations (11.4). In the course of history, besides libraries and bookshops typically semiotic associations emerged, like publishers and editors of books, papers, periodicals, and other informative media. Sometimes these are interlaced with public
broadcasting, which is not merely concerned with spoken language, but also with plastic arts or music. Semiotic associations often consist of or rely on professional authors, journalists, etc.
Enterprises maintaining communicative networks (like the telephone), have an objective function in the semiotic relation frame. They do not communicate information themselves, but facilitate it. Also associations which
do not have a semiotic character communicate with each other and with individuals.
Special institutes with the purpose of achieving collective
scientific knowledge are relatively recent. Until the seventeenth century, scientific research was not organized, but was exerted like a craft by usually isolated individuals. Only during and after the Renaissance learned societies or academies arose having
no other purpose than to perform science. Sometimes they installed observatories or laboratories, usually connected to universities, enterprises, or hospitals. Since the twentieth century, independent enterprises do contract research. Research is by no means
always purely scientific, if we understand thereby the investigation of the lawfulness of nature and society. Many institutes are directed to the collection of data (e.g., for the benefit of hospitals or for forensic research), or for the development of new
technologies. This is called applied research. The members of the board of such an institute and its co-workers are partly scientists, but the supporting staff plays an increasing professional part.
Because scientists specialise, more and more scientific societies arise, with the purpose to organize congresses, to publish scientific results, and to award many kinds of prizes and medals. By means
of peer-reviews, the editors of scientific periodicals pass a judgment of scientific work. Within an institute superiors, seniors, or colleagues judge the work of students and of junior or senior co-workers.
We investigated already the profile of an organized faith congregation (14.4); of clubs and interest groups (15.7); of enterprises (16.5); of political parties (14.4); of courts of justice (17.5);
and of institutes of care (18.4).
Apart from the state, the actors on the public domain are both individual persons and publicly acknowledged
associations, forming the civil society. The civil society can only function appropriately in a public domain which allows of the freedom and the responsibility of the people and the associations who use it. This freedom and responsibility should be warranted
by the republic.
19.5. The organisation of an association
Each association has a specific internal differentiation, a division of tasks and authority. This is the organization or bureaucracy of the association.
It has a character of its own, interlaced with but usually to be distinguished from the dual character of the association itself. Because the division of labour is economical, the primarily politically characterized organization is secondarily a projection
on the economic relation frame. Sometimes the members of the organization are not members of the association, but employees. Therefore, in an enterprise the organization cannot always be distinguished from the association itself. The organization
of an association maintains economical relations with clients and suppliers. These relations are not based on authority but on contracts.
larger an association, the more important its organization. Sometimes the organization gets so much attention that an association which is in fact primarily not economically characterized is conducted like an enterprise. However, when a hospital starts behaving
like an enterprise, the danger arises that the patients are treated like clients whose health is subordinated to the profit they generate. Within an organization a social order exists, influencing the social intercourse. Even the simplest association has an
internal division of tasks and regulations of authority. Often these lead to the formation of departments within the association or the organization. If an organization acts according to strict lines from above to below (top-down), one speaks of a centralized
or vertical hierarchy, in which higher instances delegate authority to lower ones. If the authority of the departments is emphasized, the leadership having a mandate, the organization is decentralized, horizontal, or flat, having a network
structure. In the case of delegation a higher instance may revoke each decision of a lower one, in the case of a mandate this is not generally possible. Then only the mandate can be withdrawn entirely or a great deal. The departments have a limited freedom
and responsibility. They are obliged to account for their labour after the fact. The network structure confirms the increasing professionalism of highly schooled co-workers and their own responsibility. Therefore horizontal organizations appear to have more
future than hierarchical vertical structures.
An organization requires rules and an administration, if only a list of the members and a cashbook.
In large associations, in particular the state, the organization or administration has received a relative independence from the government, in the nineteenth century recognized as the ‘fourth power’.
An abundance of internal rules gives rise to bureaucracy becoming a burden. Among other things, the organization is important for the communication of the board with the members of the association. For external relations the association has a public relations
officer or office. For enterprises advertising is mandatory.
19.6. A strong state and a strong society
We can now provide an answer to the question: What characterizes a strong state and what a strong society?
The key words are freedom and responsibility on the public domain.
A strong society is a set of networks of individual
persons and associations which are free to act and to exert their responsibility on the public domain according to shared values. It is a generally held assumption that human beings and their associations are to a certain extent free to act, and therefore
responsible for their deeds. Although this confirms common understanding, it is an unprovable hypothesis. Naturalist philosophers denying free will cannot prove their view too, but they should carry the burden of proof, in particular because they cannot account
for a free civil society. Only as far as human beings are free to act, their acts can be judged to be more or less good or bad, according to universal values like skill, beauty, significance, rationality, reliability, social coherence, mutual service, good
governance, justice, and loving care.
A strong state acts as the guardian of the social networks, recognizing and protecting the freedom and
responsibility of the actors on the public domain, respecting their rights and obligations, as stipulated by a clear set of public laws. As a constitutional state aiming at good governance it subjects itself to norms of justice. A strong state defends the
public order against criminals and aggression. It does not seek war but peace and cooperation with other states.
A state can only be
strong if it has a strong civil society (consisting of associations free of the state and the church) as its counterpart. A strong state recognizes the plurality of a strong society.
Dooyeweerd NC III, 177; Kalsbeek 1970, 260, 349’; Chaplin 2011, 111-116.
Dooyeweerd NC III, 198, 472.
Griffioen, van Woudenberg 1996; Woldring 2001; Chaplin 2011, 14-16.
Dooyeweerd 1931, 160-164; NC III, 346-376; 1959, 70-84.
Fukuyama 2011, chapter 16.
Dooyeweerd NC III, 198-214; Griffioen 2003, 13.
Dooyeweerd 1962, 169.
Franken et al. 2003, 357-359.
Schilling 1968, 104-105.
Duby 1961-1962, 24-26.
Hoogerwerf 1999, chapter 3.
Ruppert 1987; Hoogerwerf 1999, chapter 5.
Woldring 2001; Griffioen 2003, 56; Chaplin 2011, 16.
Hobsbawm 1994, 167 (chapter 4, V); Calhoun 2000, 534.
Rousseau 1762, 68-69 (section 2.4); Russell 1946, 601-610; Achterhuis 1988, part I-III; Tebbit 2005, 94-102; Fukuyama 2011, chapter 2, 82.
Rawls 1971; Sandel 2009, chapter 6.
Fukuyama 1992, chapter 14.
Achterhuis 1988, 28.
Hardt, Negri 2000, 164-166; Fukuyama 2011, 29.
Burckhardt 1905, 20 (secion 1.1); Popper 1945, 122; Midgley 1985, chapter 17, 18; Fukuyama 2011, 30, 34, 439.
Rawls 1971, 11; Von der Dunk 2007, 182-192.
Popper 1945, chapter 4.
Safranski 2007, chapter 15-17.
Diamond 1997, chapter 14.
Groen van Prinsterer 1847, 66.
Hayek 1978; Fukuyama 2011, 251-253.
Calhoun 2000. See also 5.3.
Schmitt 1963, 62-64.
Hegel, cited by Popper 1945, 317.
Kuyper 1880; 1898, 72-80 (lecture 3); Dooyeweerd 1959, 46-58; Clouser 1991, 290-302.
Chaplin 2011, chapter 11.
Chaplin 2011, 138-151.
Dooyeweerd NC I, 101-102; II, 3-54; 1962, 213; Marshall 1985, 126.
Van Doorn 2009, chapter 7.
Piketty 2013; Fukuyama 2018, 77-78.
Fukuyama 2011, 8-9, 17.
Burckhardt 1905, 20-24 (section 1.1).
Groen van Prinsterer 1847, 50-56.
Fukuyama 2011, 245-246.
Franken et al. 2003, chapter 2; Dworkin 1967, 63-64; Rutgers 2004, 175-176; Böhler 2004, 28-30; Kinneging 2005, 381-398; Tebbit 2005, 15-48.
Dooyeweerd NC III, 666; Lemon 2003, 116.
Rousseau 1762; Toulmin, Goodfield 1965, 144-148; Rawls 1971, 15-19; Graham 2004, chapter 8; Tebbit 2005, 94-102; Kuiper 2009, chapter 7; Fukuyama 2011, chapter 2.
 Franken et al. 2003, 115-116.
de Tocqueville 1835-1856, 286.
Montesquieu 1748, 219-231 (part II, book XI, chapter 6).
Dooyeweerd NC, I, 101-102.
Wolters1985, 7; Marshall 1985, 126.
Schmitt 1963, 74-78; Kuiper 2009, 231-242; Chaplin 2011, chapter 1.
Dooyeweerd NC III, 198, 472.
Dooyeweerd NC, III, 177, 180-181; Griffioen and van Woudenberg 1996.
Dooyeweerd 1962, 213-215.
Daalder 1990, 407-408.
Comte-Sponville 1995, 110 (chapter 7).